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What It's Worth To Do Your Best
Andrew Tettenborn*
It may seem a curious thing to say about an acknowledged
golden oldie of the contracts class, but if you stand back for a
moment from the decision in Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon' you
quickly see that there should not have been anything very diffi-
cult about the case. Lady Duff-Gordon's story was effectively
this: she had, in a signed document of some length and formal-
ity, deliberately promised her exclusive endorsement for one
year to Otis F. Wood, a professional promoter of designer
clothes, in exchange for precisely no commitment at all on his
part.2 For an experienced businesswoman and successful
fashionista 3 this was, to say the least, rather disingenuous4-a
disingenuousness matched only by the demerit of her subse-
quent conduct in deciding to play the New York couture market
as a whole for whatever she could get. It did not require a Car-
dozo to see that there must be something wrong, make the obvi-
ous point about Mr. Wood's implicit obligation to use his best
endeavors to promote the Lucile brand, and give judgment in
his favor.
There is, however, another slightly less obvious reason why
deciding Wood was intellectually easy. All Judge Cardozo had
to do in order to defeat a pettifogger's consideration point and
allow a deserving plaintiff to sue for breach of contract was to
find a "best efforts" obligations of some sort. Provided some ob-
ligation, however small, existed, he did not have to go further
and discuss what it entailed, or think about what measure of
* © Andrew Tettenborn 2007. University of Exeter, England.
1. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
2. Id. at 214.
3. And one who had previously done business in the United States, though on
an earlier business trip some five years beforehand she had arrived in rather less
grand style than she had hoped-namely, as a bedraggled, though fortunate survi-
vor from the Titanic.
4. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract Law, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1025 (1998) (arguing that Lady Duff-Gordon's actions were
not disingenuous).
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damages would have been available had it been broken.5 But
the latter point matters. As any properly primed J.D. candidate
will tell you, a lawyer's client is not primarily interested in the
abstract existence (or nonexistence) of a claim for breach of con-
tract, but in the figures on the check at the end of the day.
The object of this paper is to pick up this point (on which
there is less authority than one might have thought),6 and dis-
cuss the measure of damages for breach of "best endeavors" ob-
ligations and the like. In other words, what if the boot had been
on the other foot and it had been Lady Duff-Gordon who (hav-
ing, for the sake of argument, behaved impeccably in keeping
her side of the bargain) had been suing Mr. Wood for not ade-
quately promoting her collection. Or what if it had been some
other plaintiff suing for breach of some similar obligation?
My argument will be that, for a number of reasons, claim-
ing and proving damages in a case like this is often neither easy
nor straightforward for the plaintiff.
I. The Extent of "Best Efforts"
Although this is a paper primarily discussing damages, we
have to note that while establishing the existence of a "best ef-
forts" obligation can be relatively unproblematical, its content
can vary wildly, and with it what counts as a breach in the first
place. Take, for example, the common example of a promise
connected with a corporate acquisition to use best efforts to pro-
mote some product of the vendor. Just what does "best efforts"
promotion of a product involve? Is it best efforts taking into ac-
count the business of the promisor, who no doubt has plenty of
other fish to fry, or simply such efforts as are reasonable for the
product taken in isolation, even if this involves skewing the de-
fendant's business priorities by giving disproportionate weight
5. This is not an original point. It was neatly made by Melvin Eisenberg in
1998. See Eisenberg supra note 4, at 1026.
6. This may seem surprising, but the reason seems to be that many of the
cases discussing broken best-efforts promises in the light of Wood v. Lady Duff-
Gordon have involved either non-damages remedies, Leonard v. Koval, 543 N.E.2d
911 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., 271 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2001),
involving specific performance and rights of rescission respectively, or recovery
fixed by a liquidated damages clause or standby letter of credit, JKC Holding Co. v.
Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001).
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to it? 7 And what about a decision to discontinue selling that
particular line? Although the implication of good faith in any
such promise means that the promisor cannot do this for a mali-
cious or wholly inadmissible reason,8 it can be a close call, de-
pending on the precise terms of the contract, to decide whether
an otherwise unexceptionable commercial decision amounts to a
breach of contract. 9
Again, a best-efforts obligation may be free-standing (as it
was in the Wood case), but it will not always be. It may in par-
ticular be joined to another more definite contractual obligation.
A straightforward example of this is an agreement to take a
lease of real estate, or to buy a business or other asset, which is
conditional on some permission being obtained from a third
party. For instance, a business is sold subject to the agreement
of a financier to back it; the sale of a radio station is conditioned
on the grant of a license to the buyer; or real estate is leased
subject to the availability of zoning consent; but always subject
in each case to the buyer being obliged to do his 10 best to obtain
that permission. Cases such as these are closer to the late E.
Allan Farnsworth's concept of agreements where the duty to
perform is subject to a reasonableness criterion rather than
7. On which the courts have reached varying results. Compare Bloor v. Fal-
staff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), and Aeronautical Indus. Dist.
Lodge 91 v. United Techs. Corp., 230 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2000) (both imposing exact-
ing obligations), with Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984), and Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp.,
908 F.2d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1990) (two more freewheeling examples). See gener-
ally Daniel J. Coplan, When is "Best Efforts" Really "Best Efforts": An Analysis of
the Obligation to Exploit in Entertainment Licensing Agreements and an Overview
of How the Term "Best Efforts" has been Construed in Litigation, 31 Sw. U. L. REV.
725 (2002); Zachary Miller, Best Efforts?: Differing Judicial Interpretations of a
Familiar Term, 48 ARiz. L. REV. 615 (2006).
8. See Zilg, 717 F.2d at 680. The English cases reach much the same result,
through using the concept of an obligation of reasonable and bona fide perform-
ance. Paula Lee Ltd. v. Robert Zehil & Co. Ltd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 390 (Q.B.D.); And
So To Bed Ltd v. Dixon, [2001] F.S.R. 47 (Ch.D.).
9. For cases near the line, compare Zilg, 717 F.2d 671, with Contemporary
Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977), both concerning
publisher nonpromotion issues.
10. In Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, as it happened, the best efforts obligor was
male and the promisee female. I will stick to this arbitrary scheme here.
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strict:11 nevertheless, they may-as appears below-raise dif-
ferent issues of damages.
Again, many agreements involving promotion of a product
involve defendants who may well have competing products on
their books as well. A straightforward example is book-publish-
ing agreements, where publishers may well be promoting sev-
eral broadly similar books on the same subject. How far is it a
breach of such an agreement to promote another book with the
knowledge that in a limited market its sales are likely to be at
the expense of the plaintiffs opus? The answer is not particu-
larly comfortable for plaintiffs; although under the general good
faith obligation a decision of this sort may be wrongful when
wholly unjustifiable or prompted by non-business consideration
such as pique, 12 generally speaking, the possibility of competing
works is a hazard that has to be borne by the author.13
It is also worth noting that defendants' obligations can also
be affected in this respect by the exact terms of the promotion
agreement. Publishing agreements, for example, normally con-
tain not simply a best-efforts obligation but a term giving the
publisher a wide discretion as to the means of promotion (or in-
deed whether to publish at all); and although such clauses are
to some extent read down by reference to good-faith concepts, 14
11. E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best
Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1 (1984). Accord R.B. Matthews, Inc.
v. Transamerica Transp. Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1991) (concerning the
sale of goods, but seller only obliged to use best efforts to procure the goods, not
supply them, come what might).
12. See Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 281
N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1972) (rival book commissioned and pushed after acrimonious
argument with author).
13. This issue commonly arises in cases concerning best efforts obligations to
promote in patent or other licensing agreements. See Thorn Wire Co v. Washburn
& Moen Co., 159 U.S. 423, 449 (1895); see also American Mach. & Metals, Inc. v.
De Bothezat Impeller Co., 180 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1950); Arnold Prods. v. Favorite
Films Corp., 176 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
14. See Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495, 501 (2d Cir. 1985) (express
right of refusal to publish only exercisable "provided that the termination is made
in good faith, and that the failure of the author to submit a satisfactory manuscript
was not caused by the publisher's bad faith"); see also Zilg, 717 F.2d at 680. On the
other hand, applying this criterion can be difficult. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV.
369, 369 (1980) ("Neither courts nor commentators have articulated an operational
standard that distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith performance.").
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they still have the effect of reducing the obligations of the defen-
dant still further.15
The implications of all this for any hypothetical litigation
about promotion of the Lucile fashion range are obvious: if Otis
Wood had found that promoting the range would involve dispro-
portionate expenditure as against other more saleable lines, or
had simply been running a line in direct competition with it,
Lady Duff-Gordon might have faced some difficulty.
II. Damages
The above points are admittedly matters of construction of
the obligation allegedly broken, rather than of the measure of
damages. But even assuming we know the content of the obli-
gation, and breach is clear, the measure of damages is still awk-
ward. These may arise at two stages: quantification as a matter
of principle and proof.
A. The Quantification of Recovery
At least three possible issues arise here: the indeterminacy
of the obligation, proof and possible alternative measures of
damages. The latter point, admittedly an important one, we
will leave until later, and assume for the present that the basis
on which the plaintiff makes her claim is the orthodox expecta-
tion measure-that is, the plaintiffs share of the profits that
would have arisen from proper performance. 16 Assuming this is
the theory on which the plaintiff sues, these would-be profits,
are in practice, likely to be not only the measure, but also the
limit of her recovery. Although on principle there is no reason
to deny recovery for other consequential losses, such as the col-
lapse of the plaintiffs entire business, arising from failure to
promote her wares properly, in practice it is suggested that
such losses are likely to be too remote to be recovered. Only if
the plaintiff could prove pretty specific knowledge of the circum-
15. E.g., Ekern v. Sew/Fit Co., 622 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (despite best
efforts obligation, wide discretion clause allowed publisher to drop book for bona
fide business reasons).
16. "In simple terms, the measure of the damage [for failure to use best ef-
forts] is the amount necessary to put the injured party in the exact position he
would have been if the contract had not been breached." Perma Research & Dev. v.
Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
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stances likely to lead to such losses would she have much
chance of recovering them.'7
(a) A Promisor's Choice as to How to Perform: The
"Minimum Entitlement" Rule
The first difficulty with best endeavors obligations is the
fact that the duties they put on the promisor are ex hypothesi
pretty open-ended. In the nature of things it is more an art than
a science to market a product, promote a business, sweet-talk a
third party into granting a license or permit or do whatever else
forms the subject of a duty to do one's best to achieve a particu-
lar result. There are likely to be several acceptable ways of do-
ing the job, the choice between which depends on issues of
business judgment which courts are notoriously unwilling to
second-guess. And while it may be easy enough to show that a
defendant is in breach, because he has not used any of them
(where, for example, he has made no efforts at all, best or other-
wise, to achieve the desired aim), in order to prove her loss the
plaintiff must compare her position to what it would have been
had the contract been kept-i.e. had best efforts been shown.'8
But what if there were a number of different ways of per-
forming the contract while still showing best endeavors? Which
one is the reference point? A modest investment leading to
modest profits, or a substantial expenditure of revenue and
management time with correspondingly greater returns? The
general rule in contract law, on both sides of the Atlantic, is
remarkably defendant-friendly. If a contractor has a choice as
to how to perform a contractual obligation, then in the case of
nonperformance, the measure of damages is based on the mini-
mum right to performance the promisee had: that is, the least
burdensome of the defendant's options. 19
17. See Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1989) (concerning
a contract to build and run a stadium that plaintiff would have managed, the
would-be rise in value of plaintiffs surrounding land was too remote).
18. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 280 (S.D.N.Y 1978),
affd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. See Liberty Bank v. Talman Home Mortgage Corp., 877 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.
1989); see also Thornett & Fehr v. Yuills Ltd., [1921] 1 K.B. 219 (U.K.). Also on
point is the classic English "failure to publish" case of Abrahams v. Herbert Reiach
Ltd. [1922] 1 K.B. 477, 482 (U.K.), where Scrutton L.J. put the point starkly but
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It seems to follow that the plaintiff is only entitled to the
profit she would have made had the defendant done the very
minimum he could have got away with while still avoiding
breach (assuming of course that the defendant is smart enough
to provide testimony as to the various non-burdensome business
options that would have been open to him). This is likely to be a
highly significant limitation in the case of promotion contracts,
especially if the courts accept the view 20 that a defendant with a
number of products to promote is not bound to privilege the
plaintiffs interests and is entitled to apportion resources as he
would within his own business. Thus were the facts of Wood v.
Lady Duff-Gordon itself to arise today, and were it the case that
a reasonable businessperson might well downplay the Lucile
designs in comparison with others being promoted, the scope for
damages would be, to say the least, somewhat constricted.
(b) The Effect of Subsequent Events
Even assuming that the defendant does not manage to
drive down the damages using the argument from choice as to
the means of performance, this is not the only hazard awaiting
the plaintiff. Most agreements of the Wood v. Lady Duff-
Gordon type are for a limited period;21 even if this is not explic-
itly stated, a term will almost certainly be implied allowing for
their termination on reasonable notice. Moreover, in addition to
this, such agreements may well also allow for termination in
other stated eventualities, for example where the promisee's
ability to produce goods or otherwise perform her part of the
bargain is adversely affected, or the promisor is taken over by a
competitor of the promisee. In cases such as this, the rule that
a contractor is not liable in damages for failing to do that which
he or she never promised to do may well be important. Thus
with a fixed-term contract, it is suggested that the promisee
cannot be entitled to damages for more than that period, even if
it is clear that, had the promisor chosen to provide those best
logically: a contractor, he pointed out, should not be made liable in damages for not
doing that which he had not been obliged to do in the first place.
20. E.g., Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363,
1373 (7th Cir. 1990).
21. The agreement in that case was for one year, terminable thereafter on
ninety days notice. Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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efforts, he would in fact have renewed the agreement. And
where there is a provision for reasonable or fixed notice of ter-
mination, it is tentatively suggested that a similar result should
follow.
If the defendant could have cancelled the agreement on,
say, three months' notice (or, in the absence of a stipulated pe-
riod, on reasonable notice), then it is highly arguable that that
period ought to be the maximum in respect of which damages
are available. In other words, the period of profits in respect of
which damages are awarded should run only until the earliest
occasion when the defendant could have terminated the con-
tract anyway.22 The case here is rather like that of a promise of
at-will employment. Even if an employer breaks a valid con-
tract to hire an employee in the future, the plaintiffs damages
for lost pay are in most states set at nil, on the basis that the
employer has the right to fire at will and hence, whatever her
actual loss, the employee has lost nothing to which she was con-
tractually entitled.23 Yet again, if any other subsequent event
occurs which would have justified the defendant in putting an
end to the arrangement had it still been subsisting, it is sug-
gested that that event will also limit any damages available to
the plaintiff.24
22. So held in a series of franchise cases, which raise analogous issues. Mar-
tin v. U-Haul Co. of Fresno, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Hentze v. Un-
verfehrt, 604 N.E.2d 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
23. See Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. App.
Ct. 1982); see also Ewing v. Board of Trustees of Pulaski Mem'l Hosp., 486 N.E.2d
1094, 1098 (Ind. App. Ct. 1985). It is true that in such cases the plaintiff often
succeeds under a theory of promissory estoppel, for example D & G Stout, Inc. v.
Bacardi Imports, Inc., 923 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1991), but this is of no use here, since
the measure of recovery is normally limited to reliance losses such as removal ex-
penses and is most unlikely to cover profits foregone, for example Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). Accord RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF
CONTRACTS § 90, cmt. d. illus. 8 (1981).
24. If the event was foreseeable at the time of the breach, this seems rela-
tively uncontroversial. See Sheldon v. Munford, Inc., 950 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991)
(involving a franchise agreement where the court takes into account the defen-
dant's right to terminate if plaintiffs lease is not renewed). If the event was fortui-
tous and unexpected, matters are less clear, since if damages are measured as of
the time of breach then there is an argument for not taking subsequent events into
account.
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(c) Causation
A plaintiff in the position of Lady Duff-Gordon claiming
damages for breach of a promotion or other best-efforts contract
is also not unlikely to face problems connected with causation.
Lady Duff-Gordon, it is worth noting, at the time had her own
fairly successful business presence on New York's East Side,
which she had opened in 1910.25 Suppose she had alleged lost
profits on the basis that Mr. Wood had failed properly to pro-
mote couture bearing her seal of approval. It would always
have been open to Mr. Wood to argue that at least some of the
customers he had failed to drum up had not been lost at all, but
instead had simply bought the real thing from her instead: a
scenario which seems not implausible if those customers had
heard of her and were attracted by her touch.
Mr. Wood could, of course, also have argued that the al-
leged profits would not have been made even if he had promoted
the Lady Duff-Gordon name impeccably; the products might
simply not have sold because of consumer prejudice, a lack of
ready cash in the right hands or whatever. 26 But while this is
strictly speaking a causation issue, it also raises more complex
points, which will be dealt with below under the rubric of proof.
B. Problems of Proof
A plaintiff wanting damages for a breach of contract must
not only suffer a loss: it is hornbook law that she must also
prove it. In the context of a best efforts obligation to promote,
this means that she must prove that she would have made extra
profits had the defendant fulfilled his obligation, and also pro-
vide some convincing evidence of what those profits would have
been. Once again, the hurdles she faces may be more substan-
tial than one might have thought.
25. The store was at 19 E. 54th St. The success, incidentally, did not last, and
the business collapsed in 1921. See Lucile's Creditors Force Receivership, N.Y.
TIMES, March 21, 1922.
26. E.g., Nat'l Data Payment Systs. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d
Cir. 2000).
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(a) Would There Have Been Profits?
We can begin with the most basic problem: how does a best-
efforts plaintiff go about proving to a jury her would-be gains?
If she is well-entrenched in her business and her wares have a
proven track record of sales, this may not be too difficult-but
this will not always be the case. In particular, where her ven-
ture is new or relatively unestablished, this venture into the
realms of the what-if may cause heartaches. Some state courts,
it is worth remembering, hold almost as a matter of law that a
previous profitable track record is a necessary element of proof
of profits and that, absent this, projections of putative profits
are too speculative to allow any recovery. 27 Although most
states stop short of such an uncompromising approach, and sim-
ply go back to the general common law principle that damages
must be proved with reasonable certainty, 28 nevertheless they
do recognize that, as a matter of commonsense, the would-be
profits of a new business need to be proven with a good deal
more specificity. 29 Moreover, it logically follows that the same
reasoning applies to more particular issues. For example, in a
suit for failing to promote a collection of products the fact that a
particular new line is untried and is subject to the vagaries of
consumer taste has been taken to mean that damages cannot be
had for the loss of the opportunity to exploit that line because
they fail to be regarded as too speculative. 30 The effect of this in
27. See A & P Bakery Supply & Equip. Co. v. Hawatmeh, 388 So. 2d 1071(Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); see also Drs. Sellke & Conlon, Ltd. v. Twin Oaks Realty, Inc.,
491 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
28. "The damages may not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary, but
must be reasonably certain and directly traceable to the breach, not remote or the
result of intervening causes." Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234, 235
(N.Y. 1986). See also Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d
1353 (7th Cir. 1996).
29. See Handi Caddy, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 557 F.2d 136 (8th
Cir. 1977) (explicitly drawing a distinction between new versus established ven-
tures). See also Gold v. Ziff Commc'ns Co., 748 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(applying New York law and reasoning that a lack of a track record triggered the
need for greater scrutiny).
30. See Western Pub. Co., Inc. v. MindGames, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 754 (E.D.
Wis. 1996) (applying Arizona law and denying claims for lost profits arising from
alleged underpromotion of board game). See also Eastern Fed. Corp'n v. Avco-Em-
bassy Pictures, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified, 331 F. Supp.
1253 (1971) (awarding lost profits from showing movie in three theaters granted
for two already open, but not for third which was about to open).
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putting a downward pressure on the damages available to
plaintiffs such as Lady Duff-Gordon is obvious.
(b) Profits, Chances and the Vagaries of Business
Quite apart from the evidentiary difficulties in proving that
there would have been any profits at all, there is another prob-
lem that rears its head in many best efforts contexts. The diffi-
culty is this: how does a court go about awarding damages when
it is uncertain whether profits would have been made in any
particular instance, and all that can be shown is a chance-
even a fairly well-quantified one-that they would have been
forthcoming? With ongoing obligations to carry out a general
sales promotion such as that in Wood itself, this gives rise to
few difficulties. As any salesperson will confirm, in any contin-
uous sales pitch you win some and lose some. This fact is built
into the idea of periodic profit. It thus follows that if the plain-
tiff can provide convincing evidence that her business had in
fact been likely to show a given rate of profit over a given pe-
riod, taking into account the chances of success or failure in
closing particular deals, then that will provide the measure of
damages.31 But not all best efforts agreements take this form.
They may instead involve a promise to use best efforts to obtain
a particular discrete result. For example, an agreement for a
lease could contain a promise by the lessee to use best efforts to
obtain zoning or other consents, or by the lessor to terminate an
existing lease of the same property. Again, a contract for the
sale of stock or corporate acquisition agreement may require the
buyer to show best efforts to consummate some step, such as
registration or approval by the SEC or state authorities, or to
get some permit or license from a third party to regularize the
transaction and give it effect. Indeed, strictly speaking, a simi-
lar analysis will apply to many cases involving a suit for profes-
sional malpractice, as where a lawyer or other professional
undertakes to use best efforts to win a lawsuit or implement a
particular transaction.
Transactions of this "discrete results" type, it is suggested,
break down yet again into two forms. In the cases just de-
31. E.g.,Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F.2d 268, 273-74 (3d Cir.
1940), rev'd on other grounds, 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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scribed, the showing of best efforts is of the essence of the obli-
gation itself: the defendant has promised to try his best to do or
achieve Result X (or whatever other formulation we choose to
adopt in order to characterize best efforts). But this will not
always be so. Take an agreement for a lease where the lessor
promises to make the property available, or for that matter a
seller agrees to deliver goods, on a given date; but a best efforts
clause is appended exonerating him if he fails to do so despite
having tried his best.32 Here the best efforts component is not
really part of the promise at all, but merely a limitation on what
would otherwise be a strict-liability obligation. In other words,
in the first class of agreements the defendant promises to use
best efforts to achieve Result X; but in the second, he promises
to achieve Result X, subject only to a clause exonerating him if
his failure to do so is due to matters beyond his control. Al-
though the distinction may seem narrow, arguably it ought to
be significant.
As regards the latter category, where "best efforts" qualifies
the obligation rather than defining it, it is suggested that dam-
ages are not a difficulty. The primary obligation is to achieve
the promised result: because of this, the damages are the same
as they would have been for breach of an unqualified obligation,
except that the defendant can avoid paying them if he can show
that he applied his best efforts (or possibly that, even if he did
not, the result would not have been achievable even if he had
done so).33
The first category is more awkward, because although the
breach of the obligation may be clear (the defendant did not try
his best, which is what he promised to do), its consequences in
terms of loss are not, since it is generally uncertain what would
have happened if the defendant had not broken his promise.
Would the zoning consent have been granted, or would the ex-
isting tenant have vacated the property, if the defendant had
tried harder? The chances are, we do not (and indeed can not)
know for certain.
32. See R.B. Matthews, Inc. v. Transamerica Transp. Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d
269 (9th Cir. 1991).
33. Never, as far as the author has been able to ascertain, decided as such: but
it has been clearly assumed. See Madison Fund, Inc. v. Charter Co., 427 F. Supp.
597 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also R.B. Matthews, 945 F.2d 269.
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In this situation, where we are talking of the valuation of a
promised performance, there is much to be said for applying a
"loss of a chance" approach-as applied elsewhere, for example
in tort recovery for lost earnings. There, once we know the de-
fendant has wrongfully made it impossible for the plaintiff to
work, the value of what she has lost is set at the total sums she
might have earned, discounted by the chance that she might not
have earned them (as a result of accident, disability, layoff or
whatever). Logically, exactly the same reasoning should apply
to breach of an obligation to achieve a particular result: the loss
suffered by the plaintiff should be the value of the result the
defendant ought to have tried to bring about, multiplied by the
chances of success. English courts have an extended jurispru-
dence on "loss of chance" recoveries of this sort, 34 far wider than
in most U.S. jurisdictions, 35 and it is pretty clear that they
would apply this jurisprudence in most one-off best efforts
34. Most United States students will be painfully familiar with Chaplin v.
Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (U.K), the beauty contest case. This, of course, is paral-
leled in a number of United States cases. See Mange v. Unicorn Press, Inc., 129 F.
Supp. 727, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Van Gulic v. Res. Dev. Council for Alaska, 695
P.2d 1071 (Alaska 1985); RESTATEMENT [SEcoND] OF CONTRACTS § 346(3) (1981).
But in England the matter goes much further. Since the very significant decision
of the Court of Appeal in Allied Maples Group Ltd v. Simmons & Simmons, [19951
4 All E.R. 907 (Eng.), it has been clear that such an approach will be used in al-
most any case where the evaluation of the results of a defendant's wrong depends
on the hypothetical decision of some third party. That was a legal malpractice case
where lawyers for the buyer of a business negligently failed to write into the acqui-
sition contract a warranty against undiscovered liabilities. The law firm argued
that it had not been proved that such a clause, even if included, would have got
past the seller's lawyers. The court neatly sidestepped the issue and set damages
at the amount of the offending liabilities, discounted by the chance (50 percent)
that the seller's lawyers would have refused to agree to such a clause if it had been
put to them.
35. For example, since the 1950s English courts have steadfastly refused to
set up a "trial within a trial" where lawyers negligently bungle a lawsuit. Instead
they simply award the now plaintiff the amount she would have obtained multi-
plied by her would-be chances of recovering it. See Kitchen v. Royal Air Forces
Ass'n, [1958] 2 All E.R. 241 (Eng.); see also Harrison v. Bloom Camillin, [2001]
P.N.L.R. 195 (Eng.). This in stark contrast to the prevailing American approach,
which demands that the plaintiff prove on a balance of probabilities that she would
have won, and thus effectively try the case again. See Sheppard v. Krol, 578 N.E.2d
212, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see also Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 605 (Wash.
1985) (en banc). The same contrast goes for collectability. Compare Brinn v. Rus-
sell Jones & Walker, [2002] EWHC 2727 (Q.B.) (applying the English "loss of
chance approach"), with 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 24.12 (5th ed.)
(discussing the "all or nothing" United States view).
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cases. For example, in one unreported case 36 Justice Longmore
in the High Court did exactly that in the case of breach of a
promise to use best endeavors to obtain zoning consent: the
plaintiff recovered the would-be gain in value of its property if
zoning consent had been forthcoming, reduced by the percent-
age chances that it might not in fact have been got.37 In most
American jurisdictions, by contrast, it is interesting to note that
this question of indeterminacy has not unduly worried the
courts. They have fairly consistently taken the view that the
relevant loss for which the plaintiff wants reparation is the fail-
ure to achieve the stated result (not the loss of the chance of
success), and thus that the question of liability is an ordinary
causation issue. If the plaintiff can prove that it is more likely
than not that best efforts would have produced the desired re-
sult she recovers in full:38 if she cannot, she gets nothing.39
III. Other Measures of Damages
From this analysis, it is clear that a plaintiff trying to re-
cover on an expectation basis for breach will often face major
difficulties, but there may be ways around this.
To begin with, take a plausible variant on Wood v. Lady
Duff-Gordon. Assume (1) that the contract there required Lady
Duff-Gordon to bear the expenses of manufacturing a line of
couture that Mr. Wood was then to use his best efforts to sell for
her benefit; and (2) that she then sued Mr. Wood for failing to
promote it properly. Although it may be unclear, for one reason
or another, what profits from exploitation would in fact have
accrued to her, there is general acceptance that a plaintiff in a
situation such as this can elect instead to claim reliance losses
36. Motor Crown Petroleum Ltd v. S J Berwin & Co., [2000] EWCA (Civ) 70
(Eng.).
37. Id.
38. Which she would not in England. There, the "loss of chance" jurispru-
dence cuts both ways and can be invoked by the defendant as much as the plaintiff:
thus a plaintiff who shows a 75 percent likelihood that best efforts would have
succeeded still only recovers on a 75 percent basis. See Stovold v. Barlows, [1996]
P.N.L.R. 19 (Eng.). To this limited extent it must be admitted that the American
plaintiff may do better than her English counterpart.
39. E.g., Nat'l Data Payment Syss. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d
Cir. 2000).
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in the form of wasted expenditure. 40 Indeed, it is often argued
that this right is specifically meant to provide a lifeline to a
plaintiff who may face difficulties in proving an expectation
loss.41 To the extent that this is right, this may allow her to
change tack and recover on the basis of the wasted manufactur-
ing costs. 42 Moreover, this could be significant in a fair number
of cases. Having contracted for financial advisers to use their
best efforts to obtain finance for a project, a plaintiff may bor-
row money and incur substantial interest charges on it:43 a
lessee may have spent money preparing to move, or even mov-
ing, into a property in reliance on the lessor's promise to do its
best to obtain zoning consent, and so on.
Of course, this does not necessarily give Lady Duff-Gordon
or other potential plaintiffs in her position quite the free lunch
that first appears. This is for two reasons. First, although a
plaintiff is allowed to claim on the basis of her wasted expendi-
ture, the defendant is generally allowed to reduce the amount
he has to pay by reference to any overall loss the plaintiff would
have suffered had the contract been fully performed.44 Hence,
whichever way you look at it, the aim is still to put the plaintiff
in the position she would have occupied had the contract been
40. E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.16 (3d ed. 2004);
RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981). See also Wartzman v. Hight-
ower Prods. Ltd., 456 A.2d 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
41. "Where anticipated profits are too speculative to be determined, monies
spent in part performance, in preparation for or in reliance on the contract are
recoverable." Wartzman, 456 A.2d at 86. See also RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF CON-
TRACTS § 348 cmt. a (1981).
42. See Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (the court
reaches this result in the case of a best-efforts distribution contract). This jurisdic-
tion is well-established in the case of breaches of franchise agreements. See Good-
man v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see also Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Tackett, 323 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
43. McKinley Allsopp, Inc. v. Jetborne Int'l, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12405, No. 89 Civ. 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
44. RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981); see also L. Albert &
Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1949); Mistletoe Ex-
press Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637, 638-39 (Tex. App. 1988); Gruber, 126 F.
Supp. at 446. (involving a best efforts contract). For this reason, a number of com-
mentators have pointed out that there is really no substantial difference between
the expectation and reliance interests. See Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reli-
ance Interest In Contract Damages, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1755; see also David W.
Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137,
1153 (1999).
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kept: she never gets more than she has lost. And secondly, a
reliance loss plaintiff continues to be potentially worse off than
one who can actually prove the profits, since her award is
capped at the amount of her expenditure even though she
doubtless had hoped to make more. Nevertheless, the possibil-
ity of reliance damages is significant because it does make proof
easier in practice. Essentially the award of reliance damages
gives the plaintiff a presumptive buy in the first round of the
legal knock-out, by assuming (absent proof by the defendant to
the contrary) that she would at least have recouped the amount
of her expenditure and thus broken even.45
It is also worth noting that there sometimes may be yet an-
other way for a best efforts plaintiff to avoid the pitfalls of try-
ing to prove hypothetical and often speculative profits against a
defendant who refuses to do his part. By a nice irony, the 2002
California decision in Chodos v. West Publishing Co.46 involved
a successful attorney and would-be writer of legal treatises.
Publishers commissioned a book on fiduciary duties from him
on the usual terms as to best efforts to promote it once writ-
ten.47 The plaintiff wrote it in close liaison with their editors,
only to have it dropped after submission because West 48
thought it would not sell.49 Unable to prove would-be royalties
lost, the plaintiff instead claimed the value of his services on the
basis of a quantum meruit.50 The court awarded $300,000, 51
45. See Barnes, supra note 44, at 1153.
The law's goal is to get as close as possible to the award of net expectancy
consistent with its standards of proof. The latitude given to claimants in
proving lost profits evidences this concern. When it has been established
that a significant loss has occurred, the proof of damages need not be mathe-
matically precise; an approximation will suffice .... The award of costs in-
curred (expressed as reliance damages) . . . is simply the closest provable
approximation of the net expectation amount.
Id.
46. 292 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying California law), affd, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4109 (9th Cir. 2004). See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1206 (1995) (discussing this kind of recovery as a surrogate for
recovery where expectation damages are too difficult to prove).
47. Chodos, 292 F.3d at 996-97.
48. With whom the original publishers, Bancroft-Whitney, had merged. Id. at
995.
49. Id. at 994.
50. Id. at 1000-01.
51. Id.
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which was sustained on appeal on the basis that it was always
open to a plaintiff faced with a repudiatory breach to claim the
reasonable value of the services rendered.52
Admittedly awards of this sort have their limitations. A
quantum meruit can only be claimed against a defendant who
refuses to perform or commits a repudiatory breach, and not
against one who merely performs badly or incompetently.
Moreover, there must be some question over the court's deter-
mination that a plaintiff who had effectively performed in full
could claim a quantum meruit.5 3 Nevertheless, there may be
one great advantage to the plaintiff. Whereas a plaintiff opting
for reliance damages runs the risk of the defendant proving that
she would have made a loss and docking the damages accord-
ingly, it is not clear whether the same applies to a quantum
meruit claim. Although the logical position is that a plaintiff
should not be better off suing in unjust enrichment than she
would have been in a suit on the contract 54 there is respectable
authority to the contrary,55 and there was certainly no sugges-
tion in Chodos that the likely lack of success of the work in an
already overcrowded market was relevant. If so, then-at least
for plaintiffs' attorneys in California-the possibility of a quan-
tum meruit claim may prove to be a powerful weapon in their
armory.
IV. Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper can be briefly stated. Al-
though the addition, whether expressly or by implication, of a
best efforts clause to a contract may provide initial solace to
plaintiffs, its potential for large awards of damages to the likes
52. Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4109 at *4 (9th Cir.
2004).
53. A determination made on the rather curious basis that quantum meruit
was only barred where the price payable was a contractual liquidated sum, and
that a 15 percent royalty obligation was not liquidated. Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1001-
03.
54. See Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1465, 1471-72 (1994). See also the proposed draft of the Restatement [Third] of
Restitution § 38, which aims to prevent a plaintiff who has performed from getting
more than the contract price by switching to a restitution theory of recovery.
55. The classic example is the decision in Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
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of Lady Duff-Gordon is limited. Nevertheless, their outlook is
not as gloomy as it may seem, when the possibility is in account
of ingenious attorneys invoking nonstandard measures of dam-
ages on behalf of their clients.
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